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Essay 
Transparency and Transmission: 
Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and 
Market Responses to Workplace Problems 
CHARLOTTE S. ALEXANDER 
This Essay develops a comprehensive theory of the role of information 
in regulatory and market responses to workplace problems. Existing legal 
and economic scholarship has focused narrowly on transparency mandates 
that reveal facts about the hidden conditions of work—for example, the 
health risks to which workers are exposed without their knowledge, or 
undisclosed pay differentials between men and women. Scholars and 
policymakers assume that when employers are required to reveal this 
information, regulators, outside interest groups, and workers themselves 
will penalize bad actor employers via the market, regulation, or rights-
enforcing litigation. However, information about the hidden conditions of 
work is not self-actuating. Regulatory and market responses depend on 
additional layers of information—information about context, process, 
incentives, and the probability and magnitude of other actors’ regulatory 
and market responses—all of which have been largely ignored in the 
literature. Accordingly, this Essay offers a typology of the information that 
may support rights-enforcing and market responses to workplace 
problems. It then surveys existing transparency mandates to determine the 
extent to which each type of information is currently made available in the 
workplace. The Essay concludes by mapping out topics for further 
research, including the First Amendment implications of drafting 
employers into the role of information transmitters and the empirical 
question of how best to design workplace transparency mandates to 
accomplish their goals. 
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Transparency and Transmission: 
Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and 
Market Responses to Workplace Problems 
CHARLOTTE S. ALEXANDER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For thirty years, Geraldean Matthew worked on the muck farms around 
Lake Apopka, Florida, hand-harvesting the vegetables that grew in the 
rich, black lakeshore soil.1 As she worked, crop dusters flew overhead, 
coating everything below—fields and workers alike—with “strong 
chemicals that you could smell on your skin at the end of the work day.”2 
Ms. Matthew now suffers from a host of debilitating medical conditions 
that she attributes to pesticide exposure.3 Though the Apopka muck farms 
have long been closed, visitors today are barred from entering the fields by 
signs that warn about the presence of “agricultural chemicals, some of 
which, such as DDT . . . may present a risk to human health.”4 When Ms. 
Matthew and her fellow farmworkers were in the fields, however, they 
received no such warning, and had no information about what, exactly, was 
being dumped on them from above, and what it was doing to their health.5   
Many states away and several decades later, Kelly Contreras began 
work in Wisconsin as a store manager for the country’s largest retail 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, J. Mack 
Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University; secondary appointment, Georgia State 
University College of Law. Thanks to the participants in the 2014 Labor and Employment Law 
Colloquium, University of Colorado Law School at Boulder and the 2014 American Business Law 
Journal Invited Scholars Colloquium. Thanks also to Helen Norton and Stephen Shore for their helpful 
feedback. 
1 Christopher Balogh, Apopka Farmworkers Say Pesticide Exposure Caused Illnesses, ORLANDO 
WEEKLY (June 1, 2011), http://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/apopka-farmworkers-say-pesticide-
exposure-caused-illnesses/Content?oid=2248681 [http://perma.cc/K5BT-7LV3]; see generally BARRY 
ESTABROOK, TOMATOLAND: HOW MODERN INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE DESTROYED OUR MOST 
ALLURING FRUIT 48 (2012) (“In 1941, as part of the wartime effort to produce more fruits and 
vegetables, nineteen thousand acres of swamp on the lake’s north shore were drained to make way for 
‘muck farms’ in the rich soil.”). 
2 Balogh, supra note 1. 
3 DALE FINLEY SLONGWHITE, FED UP: THE HIGH COSTS OF CHEAP FOOD 36–39 (2014). 
4 ESTABROOK, supra note 1, at 49; see also Balogh, supra note 1. 
5 Balogh, supra note 1 (quoting a former Apopka farmworker as saying that she and other 
workers “are lost in a ‘chemical soup,’” lacking “evidence that they’ve been hurt by pesticides”). 
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jewelry chain.6 She was paid approximately $35,000 per year.7 Her 
husband, who had similar industry experience, was also a store manager at 
the same company.8 His annual salary was $55,000.9 After three years, Ms. 
Contreras had amassed multiple company awards and was promoted to 
district manager.10 Her husband, who had been promoted to district 
manager the year before, continued to out-earn her by $10,000.11 Ms. 
Contreras knew about this salary discrepancy by the happenstance of her 
marriage; company rules prohibited workers from sharing information 
about their pay.12    
Information is crucial to workplace rights enforcement. If Ms. 
Contreras had not known her husband’s salary, she may never have 
discovered that she was subject to sex-based pay discrimination,13 and may 
never have engaged in corrective action. She could not have complained 
internally to her employer, made a report to a government enforcement 
agency, or filed a lawsuit—as she eventually did—under the Equal Pay Act 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.   
Information is equally central to market-based solutions to workplace 
problems. If a worker like Ms. Matthew does not know about her health 
risks at work, she cannot “shop around” for a better job and penalize her 
unsafe employer by quitting; she cannot call the media; she cannot 
organize a consumer boycott or incite investor or advocacy group pressure. 
Nor can regulators or outside interest groups take affirmative action to 
address workplace problems if they do not know that problems exist. 
As a result, scholars and policymakers have long advocated for rules 
that would force employers to reveal information about the hidden 
                                                                                                                          
6 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Arbitration Complaint ¶¶ 103–05, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, 
Inc., AAA Case No. 11 160 00655 08 (Jan. 3, 2008),  http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/7/ 
media.187.pdf [http://perma.cc/JX8V-Q3E9] [hereinafter Jock, First Amended Complaint]. 
7 Id. ¶ 113.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. ¶¶ 107–08, 111. 
11 Id. ¶ 114. 
12 Id. ¶ 34. 
13 This account assumes for the sake of illustration that the pay gap can be explained only by the 
workers’ gender and sets aside other possible explanations for the difference or general market-based 
objections to the prohibition of sex discrimination in pay. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica 
R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 
162–63 (2011) (discussing “market excuses” for pay discrimination such as the belief that women fail 
to negotiate their salaries at the time of hire and that downstream differences in salaries between men 
and women can therefore be explained by women’s and men’s different negotiating choices rather than 
employer bias). In fact, a store manager explained to another female plaintiff in the case that a male 
worker was paid more than his more experienced female counterparts “because he had a child to 
support.” Jock, First Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 72. 
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conditions of work, focusing primarily on hazard warnings14 and pay 
transparency rules.15 In a pair of recent articles, Professor Cynthia Estlund 
proposes a dramatically expanded workplace transparency regime, in 
which employers would be required to reveal information about wages, 
scheduling, hazards, job security, work-life policies, covenants not to 
compete, arbitration agreements, and workplace demographics.16 In 
Estlund’s view, this information would enable workers to make better 
choices about whether to take or keep a job; enable regulators to identify 
employer scofflaws and enhance legal compliance; and allow do-gooder 
firms to enhance their reputation by advertising their “beyond compliance” 
policies and practices.17 Similarly, as Professor Kip Viscusi explains in his 
extensive writing on workplace safety, workers armed with hazard 
information can exact a price from their employers either by quitting or by 
demanding a wage surplus to compensate for their health and safety 
risks—eventually, either result can pressure the employer to correct the 
                                                                                                                          
14 Since the late 1970s, Professor Kip Viscusi has studied hazard warnings that inform workers of 
toxin exposure. See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN 
THE WORKPLACE (1983) [hereinafter VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE]; W. KIP VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT 
HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE (1979) [hereinafter VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT 
HAZARDS]; W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER 
RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 125–26 (1987) (reporting findings that “provide support for the 
efficacy of information policies to control the hazards from dangerous products”); see also Ronnie 
Greene, Farmworkers Plagued by Pesticides, Red Tape, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/06/25/9159/farmworkers-plagued-pesticides-red-tape [http://perm 
a.cc/5EHZ-25ZD] (quoting an Environmental Protection Agency document as noting that, even for a 
government agency, the lack of information surrounding the number of occupational pesticide incidents 
per year “inhibits clear problem identification”). 
15 Many scholars have championed pay transparency rules, which would force employers to 
publicize their wage and salary schedules and prohibit bans on workers’ discussions of pay. See 
Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2011) 
[hereinafter Estlund, Just the Facts]; see also Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace 
Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781, 783 n.7 (2014) [hereinafter 
Estlund, Extending the Case] (citing Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. 
Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 169–70 
(2004); Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 41, 53 (2005); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based 
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 1008 (2011); Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond 
the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory Wage Disclosure Laws—A Necessary Tool for Closing the 
Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 385, 419–35 (2013); Gowri Ramachandran, Pay 
Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1047–48 (2012)); Jeremy Blasi, Note, Using Compliance 
Transparency to Combat Wage Theft, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95 (2012) (discussing wage 
transparency proposal). See generally Estlund, Just the Facts, supra, at 784 n.13 (noting that seasonal 
and agricultural workers’ wages must be disclosed under federal law and that New York, Iowa, and 
Nebraska have all enacted some form of pay transparency requirement). 
16 See Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 15; Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15. Part III, 
infra, identifies additional types of workplace transparency mandates. 
17 Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 369–79 (discussing disclosure in aid of contract, 
disclosure in aid of compliance, and disclosure in aid of reputational rewards and sanctions). 
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underlying hazard.18 Information is thus instrumental: transparency 
mandates are designed with the first-order goal of revealing the true 
conditions under which workers are employed, but also with the second-
order goal of prompting regulatory or market responses to improve those 
conditions.     
However, this view of information’s triggering role is incomplete. 
While information about the hidden conditions of work is necessary for 
market discipline and rights enforcement, it is far from sufficient. The key 
insight here is that factual information about the hidden conditions of work 
is not self-actuating. In other words, arming workers like Ms. Matthew 
with the name, concentration, and health risks of the chemicals with which 
she was sprayed and allowing Ms. Contreras freely to discuss her salary 
cannot trigger a regulatory or market response on its own. These workers 
must have additional layers of information before they can even identify 
their chemical exposure or pay disparity as a sub-market practice or 
potential violation of the law and decide what to do about it.  
Accordingly, this Essay develops a comprehensive theory of 
information’s role in the enforcement of labor and employment laws, and 
in the broader project of improving workplace conditions. This 
contribution is important, as it enables assessment of the sorts of 
information-centric regulatory strategies that are increasingly popular 
across the political spectrum as a less onerous, almost “magic” alternative 
to command-and-control substantive regulation.19 If such strategies focus 
on only one type of information and neglect the others, then they cannot 
harness the market and facilitate law enforcement in the way that 
proponents envision. 
First, this Essay identifies the three sets of actors who might engage in 
rights-enforcing or market responses to a workplace problem: workers 
                                                                                                                          
18 VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 14, at 73 (“Providing workers with additional 
information about job risks will sharpen their assessment of the risks, which will tend to increase the 
wages the firm must pay.”); VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 129 (noting findings that disclosure 
of information about “higher [job hazard] risks led to both a demand for more risk compensation and 
higher intended quit rates”). 
19 Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 353, 354 (observing that “mandatory disclosure has 
become a growing part of the modern state's regulatory repertoire” and that mandated disclosures about 
“risks, returns, costs, [and] benefits” are central features of securities, consumer finance, health, 
environmental, education, and food and drug safety regulation); id. at 354 (describing disclosure 
mandates as “sometimes appear[ing] as a kind of magical minimalism that delivers significant rewards 
at little cost”); see also VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 2 (“From an economic standpoint, the 
potential role of labels and other forms of information transfer is identical: all of them influence 
perceptions of risk and, ultimately, individual behavior.”); David J. Doorey, A Model of Responsive 
Workplace Law, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47, 67 (2012) (“Information disclosure regulation is another 
preferred tool in the decentred regulation arsenal . . . .”); cf. VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 14, 
at 72–73 (“Information directed at improving safety, such as safety training procedures, has two types 
of effects. First, it may alter workplace safety levels. . . . Second, providing safety information has 
purely informational aspects . . . .”). 
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themselves, regulators, and outside interest groups, defined here as 
consumers, investors, and advocates.20 It also identifies the circumstances 
under which an employer might take affirmative steps to correct a problem 
even in the absence of prompting by one of those three.   
For each actor, the Essay then identifies the types of information that 
may support regulatory or market responses. Here, this Essay complements 
and extends the existing literature by hypothesizing a layered set of five 
types of workplace information: Estlund- and Viscusi-style firm-specific 
information about the hidden conditions of work (Type A); context 
information that allows comparison to conditions at other firms or to the 
substantive requirements of the law (Type B); process information that sets 
out the necessary steps for engaging in market discipline or rights 
enforcement (Type C); incentives information that reveals the benefits of 
market or regulatory action (Type D); and information on the probability 
and magnitude of other actors’ responses to the workplace problem (Type 
E).21   
After establishing this theory, the Essay surveys labor and employment 
law and identifies existing transparency rules that force or incentivize 
transmission of information of each of the five types. At present, the law 
requires disclosure of some information types in certain circumstances, but 
never the full complement at the same time.   
Finally, this Essay catalogs some challenges to and complications with 
workplace transparency mandates, including the First Amendment 
implications of drafting employers into the role of information provider 
and the empirical question of whether transparency mandates actually 
achieve their first- and second-order goals. These questions are raised here 
in brief, but deferred for complete examination in a second, companion 
article.22   
Thus, the Essay proceeds as follows. Part II elaborates on the typology 
of workplace actors and information introduced above, building on 
previous legal and economic scholarship on the functions of information in 
the workplace. Part III surveys existing workplace transparency 
mandates—those already identified in the literature and those that have 
been left out—and maps them onto the typology. Part IV briefly catalogs 
the First Amendment questions and logistical complications raised by 
workplace transparency mandates. Part V concludes. 
                                                                                                                          
20 This configuration borrows heavily from Estlund’s description of the three outcomes of 
employer disclosure mandates and the actors who would drive those outcomes, particularly her 
discussion of the role of intermediaries. Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 369–76. 
21 FIGURE 2 in Part II.B, infra, illustrates these types of information.   
22 Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information Forcing: Constitutionality and Effectiveness, 
53 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2016).   
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II.  DEVELOPING A TYPOLOGY OF WORKPLACE  
ACTORS AND INFORMATION  
A. Existing Legal and Economic Scholarship on Workplace Information 
The existing legal scholarship on information in the workplace has 
focused narrowly on forcing the transmission of firm-specific facts about 
the hidden conditions of work—referred to here as “Type A” 
information—to facilitate the enforcement of labor and employment 
laws.23 In this view, rights violations can be obscured when the underlying 
facts are held exclusively or actively hidden by the employer, with no real 
opportunity for independent discovery.24 When employers are required to 
reveal Type A information, the assumption is that workers and regulators 
can then engage in rights enforcement: Ms. Contreras files suit; Ms. 
Matthew files a workers’ compensation claim or complains to a 
government agency; agencies take independent enforcement action even in 
the absence of worker complaints.25 Outside interest groups, including 
advocacy organizations, consumers, and investors, might also penalize 
firms that engage in unlawful workplace practices by filing lawsuits or 
making government complaints of their own (assuming they have 
standing). The disclosure of Type A information about rights violations 
might also prompt outside interest groups to engage in market discipline by 
boycotting the firms’ goods and services, impugning their reputation, or 
divesting from their companies.26 In addition, employers themselves might 
be prompted to correct legal problems affirmatively if transparency 
mandates force them to identify and disclose underlying Type A facts.27   
                                                                                                                          
23 See, e.g., Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 365–67 (proposing a variety of Type A 
employer-disclosure mandates). 
24 Of course, this information might become available during the discovery phase of litigation, but 
this opportunity for information transmission necessarily comes after a workplace problem has been 
identified. 
25 See Doorey, supra note 19, at 67 (“Information disclosure regulation is another preferred tool in 
the decentred regulation arsenal . . . . [T]here is also a long history of using information regulation to 
influence firm behaviour in such areas as environmental and human rights practices . . . . It can clarify 
the expectations of contracting parties, which can reduce the possibility of the more powerful 
contracting party taking advantage of the weaker party. Disclosure regulation can also empower private 
actors in their engagements with the disclosing firms. By providing information about firm behaviour 
to private watchdogs, it can alter the relative balance of power between the firms and the watchdogs 
and thereby alter the dynamic of the negotiations.” (footnote omitted)). 
26 See id. (“If disclosing information about some aspect of firm performance could potentially 
influence sales or increase public appetite for more formal government oversight, then it can encourage 
corporate leaders to take a more personal interest in the firm's performance, and perhaps to introduce 
more effective systems to ensure that the firm's performance improves relative to other similarly 
situated firms.”). 
27 See id. (“Disclosure can lead to better-informed actors. It facilitates self-learning or self-
referential fact-finding; a firm that does not know it is engaging in harmful behaviour is unlikely to take 
steps to alter that behaviour.”). 
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The economics literature presents a different view of the function of 
workplace transparency: even if Type A information reveals no specific 
violations of labor and employment laws, transparency mandates may still 
allow workers and firms to match to one another more precisely.28 Here, 
the goal of transparency is to enhance market efficiency rather than to 
facilitate law enforcement—that is, to allow a worker to seek out a firm 
with characteristics that fit her preferences.29 In the absence of Type A 
information, uncertainty about the true conditions of work may dissuade 
workers from entering the labor market at all, or may result in their 
accepting a job that is a bad match.30 On the other hand, for example, when 
workers are aware of toxins at work and know their own and their co-
workers’ wage rates, they can assess the fit of their current or potential job 
with their preferences. In the case of a mis-fit, workers might quit or forgo 
a job opportunity, or might demand a wage premium or other concession 
from the employer as compensation.31 This information-driven matching 
                                                                                                                          
28 See, e.g., VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 14, at 73 (“[W]orkers could improve their job 
choices if they knew of the risks posed by different positions . . . .”). 
29 See Doorey, supra note 19, at 67 (“Disclosure regulation is usually justified as market-
correcting: it corrects information asymmetries that impede the efficient clearing of markets.”); John 
Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 825, 846 (2006) (“Many of the prominent examples of penalty default rules in the contractual 
area serve the purpose of information-forcing in the service of efficiency.”). 
30 For an archetypal discussion of the ability of information transmission mandates to correct 
market failures caused by information asymmetry in a sales contract setting, see George A. Akerlof, 
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 
(1970) (“An asymmetry in available information has developed: for the sellers now have more 
knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers. But good cars and bad cars must still sell at the 
same price—since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good car and a bad car.”).  
Examples of information asymmetry and information forcing in other contexts include toxicity 
information held exclusively by polluters and private information held by a party to litigation. See 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 
874 (2006) (describing state regulation that “gives toxic polluters in California an unusual incentive to 
cooperate with state regulators in setting, justifying, and defending numerical regulatory standards and 
to produce and disclose as much credible toxicity and exposure information necessary to enable 
regulators to implement these regulatory standards”); Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to 
Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 183, 183 (1989) (developing a model of information 
asymmetry in which “one party [to litigation] possesses ‘private’ information [that] pertains to the 
expected judgment he would obtain from trial—to the likelihood of prevailing at trial or to the size of 
the judgment he would receive in that event”). In the alternative to a mandate, information might be 
transmitted in response to incentives. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (introducing the concept 
of “penalty defaults” used to fill gaps in contracts, the avoidance of which incentivizes better-informed 
parties to disclose information); J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, 916 (2015) (“[A] legal-information-forcing rule would force the 
comparatively better informed party to choose between revealing the relevant . . . information or 
accepting a default rule that favors the less informed party.”).  
31 Kip Viscusi and his co-authors have written extensively about this process in the context of 
hazard labeling and workers’ risk assessments. See, e.g., VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 100–01 
(“[W]orkers are engaged in a continuous experimentation process in which they learn about the risks 
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process not only improves the functioning of the labor market, but may 
also, over time, prod employers who experience high job vacancy or quit 
rates, or who have to meet workers’ repeated compensatory wage 
demands, to correct the underlying workplace problems.32     
Thus, taken together, the legal and economics literatures identify three 
actors who might respond to a workplace problem that is disclosed via 
Type A information: workers, regulators, and outside interest groups. Each 
of these actors, in turn, is assumed to engage in a rights-enforcing and/or 
market response, and the employer itself might also take affirmative, 
corrective action upon receiving Type A information. FIGURE 1 below 
maps out these three actors, plus the employer, and their assumed 
regulatory and/or market responses to workplace problems that are 
revealed by the disclosure of Type A information.  
                                                                                                                          
posed by their job and quit once the position becomes sufficiently unattractive.”). The threat of 
quitting, or the employer’s inability to fill a job with a given risk profile, may then produce higher 
wages that include a wage differential that compensates workers for taking on that job’s health and 
safety risks. Id. at 129 (“[H]igher risks led to both a demand for more risk compensation and higher 
intended quit rates.”).  
32 In addition to Viscusi, Estlund also builds on this literature by characterizing one of the goals of 
employer disclosure mandates as “disclosure in aid of contract.” Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, 
at 371 (“[E]conomic theory suggests that employees armed with better information about terms and 
conditions of employment will be more likely to find jobs that suit them at wages that reflect the actual 
features of the job, and employers will be more likely to deliver job features that meet employee 
preferences.”). 
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FIGURE 1: Actors’ Assumed Regulatory and Market Responses to the 
Disclosure of Type A Information  
 
 
 
 
 
Actor Rights-
Enforcing 
Response(s) 
Market 
Response(s) 
Combined 
Response(s) 
Workers  Remain in 
job and file a 
lawsuit 
 Remain in 
job and 
complain to a 
regulator 
 Remain in 
job and make 
a wage 
demand 
 Quit or reject 
a potential 
job 
 Exit job and 
file a 
lawsuit 
 Exit job and 
complain to 
a regulator 
Outside 
interest 
groups  
 Complain to 
a regulator 
 File a lawsuit 
(if standing) 
 Reputational 
penalty 
 Boycott 
 Divestment 
 
 File 
complaint/ 
lawsuit and 
engage in 
market 
discipline 
Regulators  Engage in 
complaint-
driven 
enforcement  
 Engage in 
affirmative 
enforcement 
 N/A  N/A 
 
However, contrary to the assumptions embedded in the legal and 
economics literatures, Type A information alone is not self-actuating. One 
or more of four additional types of information may be necessary to 
support the rights-enforcing and market responses summarized in FIGURE 
1.33 
B. Additional Necessary Workplace Information: Workers 
Another story illustrates the necessary but insufficient nature of Type 
A information. In 2006, after Hurricane Katrina, a shipyard with locations 
                                                                                                                          
33 To be clear, this Essay does not argue that even a full complement of all five information types 
would in all cases be sufficient to trigger action to correct workplace problems. This is discussed 
further in Part IV.B, infra. Instead, the claim here is that Type A information alone is insufficient. At 
minimum, more information of different types is needed. At maximum, more information of different 
types plus a different substantive and procedural law regime, different market conditions, and different 
incentive structure around workplace rights enforcement and market discipline may be sufficient. 
Employer 
Type A information 
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in Mississippi and Texas imported almost 600 men from India with 
temporary H-2B guestworker visas to repair oil rigs and other equipment 
that was damaged by the storm.34 The workers were kept in “guarded, 
overcrowded, and isolated labor camps,” where visitors were rarely 
allowed.35 They were subject to threats, “psychological abuse, and 
coercion.”36 They were paid less than the minimum wage,37 and exorbitant 
fees for their squalid housing were deducted from their paychecks.38    
These workers were well aware of the conditions under which they 
were working; there was no need for a transparency mandate to reveal the 
desperate, obvious facts of their jobs.39 Unlike Ms. Matthew, who knew 
that she was being exposed to something but did not know its name or its 
health risks, and unlike Ms. Contreras, who but for her marriage could not 
have discovered that she was paid less than her male counterparts, there 
was nothing hidden about the circumstances under which the H-2B 
workers were employed.     
However, the H-2B workers’ Type A knowledge of the conditions of 
their jobs could not, in and of itself, trigger them to take action. In their 
isolation, these workers had no access to other information that would 
enable them to engage in a rights-enforcing or market response to the 
workplace problems they encountered. They could not give meaning to and 
contextualize their experiences by comparing their jobs to available jobs at 
other firms40 or to the substantive requirements of U.S. labor and 
employment laws. They did not know the process by which they might 
seek out other jobs or seek to enforce their labor and employment rights.41 
They could not accurately assess the potential costs and benefits of rights-
enforcing or market action; they had no sense of whether other regulatory 
or market actors might come to their figurative rescue by independently 
                                                                                                                          
34 Sixth Amended Complaint ¶ 1, David v. Signal Int’l, No. 08-1220-SM-DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 
2014); see also Federal Jury in SPLC Case Awards $14 Million to Indian Guest Workers Victimized in 
Labor Trafficking Scheme by Signal International and Its Agents, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 18, 2015) 
[hereinafter SPLC Award], http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/federal-jury-in-splc-case-awa 
rds-14-million-to-indian-guest-workers-victimized-in- [https://perma.cc/74YQ-GVK8]. 
35 Sixth Amended Complaint, supra note 34, ¶¶ 6, 209. 
36 Id. ¶ 6 
37 Id. ¶ 216. 
38 Id. ¶ 534–40. 
39 Viscusi has pointed out that express warnings about the conditions of work may not be 
necessary once a worker engages in a process of on-the-job learning, which is often sufficient to alert a 
worker of the true conditions of work. VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 100 (describing a process 
of Bayesian updating in which “workers begin jobs with imperfect information . . . . [and] [a]fter 
acquiring risk information, most workers display the capacity to update their probabilistic beliefs”). 
40 Indeed, the terms of the H-2B visas prohibited workers from changing jobs; if they left their job 
at Signal International, they were required to return to India rather than take a new job in the United 
States. Julia Preston, Suit Points to Guest Worker Program Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A12. 
41 Sixth Amended Complaint, supra note 34, ¶ 9 (describing the plaintiffs as “[d]eeply indebted, 
fearful, isolated, disoriented, and unfamiliar with their rights under United States law”). 
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forcing change at their workplace. 
Thus, if information is going to trigger the sorts of outcomes 
envisioned by Estlund and Viscusi, transparency mandates cannot stop at 
Type A information alone. Type A information is merely the raw material 
of workplace problems, describing what is actually happening on the job. 
Ms. Matthew and Ms. Contreras needed access to that raw material, which 
otherwise would have been hidden from them by the policies and 
structures of their workplaces. The H-2B workers did not need such access, 
as they lived their workplace problems every day. Regardless, for any of 
those three sets of workers, Type A information alone is insufficient. 
Focusing here on workers as the relevant actors, then, five total types of 
information are necessary, differing in content depending on whether 
workers engage in a rights-enforcing or market action. (The information 
necessary for regulator and outside interest group action is discussed 
further in the section that follows.) FIGURE 2 illustrates these five 
information types. 
 
FIGURE 2: Information Necessary for Market and Rights-Enforcing 
Responses to Workplace Problems 
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matter, their conditions of work actually are.   
Type C information concerns process, or the steps that a worker must 
take to engage in a rights-enforcing or market response to the problem 
exposed at the Type A stage. Here, a worker might need to know about 
administrative presentment or exhaustion rules, e.g., the requirement of 
filing a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of a discriminatory event.42 If the 
worker is contemplating a market response, he or she would need to know 
about the availability of job openings at other firms, their qualification 
requirements, and the process by which he or she could apply.43   
Type D information, in turn, reveals to workers the costs and benefits 
of taking either market or regulatory action. On the rights-enforcing track, 
this would include what I have called in other work “operational rights,” or 
the set of protections and incentives built into labor and employment laws 
that are designed to encourage worker lawsuits.44 These include protections 
against retaliation, liquidated (double) damages, and attorneys’ fees and 
costs for prevailing plaintiffs. On the market side, Type D information 
would include the full range of transaction and opportunity costs incurred 
by switching jobs. 
Finally, Type E information consists of the probability and magnitude 
of other actors’ responses to disclosed information about workplace 
                                                                                                                          
42 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012). 
43 Worker’s rights-enforcing and market responses to a workplace problem may in some sense be 
interchangeable. In other words, when opportunities to switch jobs are slim, a worker might instead 
stay at her current job and file a lawsuit or complain to a government agency. See ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
STATES 30 (1970) (defining a worker's choices when faced with a problem within her organization as 
exit, voice, and loyalty: “Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape 
from, an objectionable state of affairs”); see also John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and 
Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
709, 710 (1993) (“[A] strong economy is a powerful ally for victims of discrimination. Indeed, many 
such individuals have deemed this market remedy to be preferable to the legal remedies for 
discrimination that have been in place for the past twenty-five years. When the economy is healthy, 
victims of discrimination can more easily find new jobs without suffering an extended period of 
unemployment. Many potential litigants bypass their legal remedies when they believe that adequate 
market opportunities exist. Conversely, a recessionary economy, and the excess supply of labor that 
attends it, creates an opportunity for employers to indulge discriminatory preferences and choose 
workers on the basis of irrational prejudice or tastes.”). 
44 Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case Study, 33 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353, 386 (2012) (coining the term “operational rights” to describe the set 
of incentives and protections that “encourage statutory enforcement through private lawsuits by directly 
influencing potential plaintiffs' decision-making; they put substantive rights into operation. . . . [and] 
are designed to increase the benefits of taking legal action and decrease the costs, acting as a thumb on 
a worker's cost-benefit scale and tipping it in the direction of exercising ‘voice’ on the job”); Charlotte 
S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. 
L.J. 1069, 1102 (2014) (further explaining the concept of “operational rights”); see also Margaret H. 
Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 783 (2011) (discussing “suit boosters” or 
incentives offered to plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring private litigation). 
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problems. In some sense, Type E information is a subset of Type D 
information, in that Type D reveals to workers the costs and benefits of 
taking action. If workers are assured that another actor is going to address, 
effectively, workplace problems—if OSHA is going to inspect and clean 
up an unsafe workplace, for example, or if the U.S. Department of Labor is 
going to file a wage and hour suit against an employer—then the benefits 
of a worker’s taking independent enforcement action or leaving the firm 
would be slight. However, this Essay treats Type E information as a 
separate category because of its importance to actors’ decision-making. As 
explained further below, employers in particular may be especially 
sensitive to the likelihood and probable magnitude of other actors’ 
responses in deciding whether to take affirmative steps to address disclosed 
workplace problems. 
Returning to the earlier stories, the H-2B workers described above 
were eventually able to make contact with workers’ rights advocates, who 
equipped them with the information necessary for a group of plaintiffs to 
file suit under a variety of federal employment and anti-trafficking laws. In 
February 2015, five of those workers won a jury verdict of $14 million.45 
Ms. Contreras, too, ultimately filed suit against her employer, alleging that 
she was subject to pay discrimination in violation of federal employment 
law.46 She likely gathered the context, process, incentives, and other actor 
information necessary for her claims from fellow workers who had already 
joined the lawsuit, or perhaps from information provided by the plaintiffs’ 
class action attorneys.47 
Ms. Matthew’s story provides a sobering counter-example, however, 
of the importance of Type B–E information in triggering worker action. 
Ms. Matthew now suffers from the autoimmune disease lupus, which she 
attributes to her decades-long pesticide exposure.48 She says that, “[a]s far 
                                                                                                                          
45 SPLC Award, supra note 34 (describing jury award). 
46 Jock, First Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶¶ 1–3. In February 2015, an arbitrator granted 
class certification in the suit to a class of 44,000 current and former women to proceed with their pay 
discrimination claims. Class Determination Award at 2, 118, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., No. 11 20 
0800 0655 (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/0/media.1710.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/R7TT-J9B2] (Part 1) and http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/1/media.1711.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/K87Y-VBAH] (Part 2); Sterling Jewelers, COHEN MILSTEIN, http://www.cohenmilstein.com/cases/97/ 
sterling-jeweler [http://perma.cc/3X8A-SPN8] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
47 For example, class counsel for the plaintiffs have the following notice on their website: “It is 
very important that anyone, female or male, who has information about these discrimination allegations 
or more generally about how Sterling has treated its women employees please call the lawyers . . . 
providing your contact information and where you worked for Sterling . [sic] You may also contact our 
co-counsel . . . . We are interested in speaking with former or current employees, both male and female. 
(Please note that we are not ethically permitted to discuss the case with current managers unless they 
believe they have experienced or are experiencing gender discrimination at Sterling).” Sterling 
Jewelers, supra note 46. 
48 SLONGWHITE, supra note 3, at 55 (discussing Ms. Matthew’s lupus diagnosis); id. at 104 
(discussing links between pesticide exposure and lupus). 
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back as 1974, we [farmworkers] talk[ed] among ourselves because we 
knew that when we go home at night there was something going on with 
our bodies.”49 
However, Ms. Matthew did not engage in a rights-enforcing response: 
she did not file a workers’ compensation claim, sue her employer, or 
complain to a regulatory agency. Though she clearly lacked complete Type 
A information about her chemical exposure, she attributes her and her 
fellow workers’ silence to two additional information deficits: lack of legal 
rights information (Type B) and lack of information about the incentives 
for rights-enforcing action (Type D). She describes many farmworkers as 
lacking information about their legal rights; as she says, “Why should 
[employers] recruit a person who is educated and smart and know[s] the 
law?”50 She also describes the costs of engaging in rights-enforcing 
behavior:  
In the fields, if you go talkin’ about you got sick because of 
the pesticides, there was a hush mouth, because if you didn’t 
keep your mouth closed, they would retaliate against you. 
They would tell you, ‘Well, you don’t come back.’ And then 
you wouldn’t have a job, so you had to take a lot of stuff.51 
Ms. Matthew received no countervailing information describing the 
potential benefits of rights enforcement—paid medical costs and other 
compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, or changes in farms’ use of 
hazardous chemicals—to weigh against this retaliation risk.52 
Nor did Apopka farmworkers penalize their employers via the labor 
market by quitting en masse. Indeed, the growers in the area may have 
actively blocked workers from receiving information on other available 
jobs (Type B) and the requirements and process for a job switch (Type C). 
As one journalist commented, after the State of Florida shut down the 
Apopka muck farms due to pesticide-related mass bird deaths (not, 
importantly, due to harmful effects on workers’ health), “[workers] were 
not retrained for new jobs because the powerful farmers feared that 
educated workers would abandon the fields before the last carrot or tomato 
was picked.”53 
                                                                                                                          
49 Id. at 39. 
50 Id. at 48. 
51 Id. at 39. 
52 As discussed further in Part IV, infra, even if Ms. Matthew did know about the potential 
benefits of rights enforcement, they may not have outweighed the risks associated with filing a lawsuit. 
See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 44, at 1106 (“Against these costs, the benefits of claiming appear 
paltry. Though back pay may be available to a plaintiff at the end of a lawsuit, if that amount is 
insufficiently large—and for plaintiffs who sue because they were paid less than the minimum wage, 
back pay awards will, by definition, be quite small—then enduring the uncertain, stressful, drawn-out 
process of litigation may not be worth it.”). 
53 ESTABROOK, supra note 1, at 49. 
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Thus, the differing outcomes in these three worker stories illustrate the 
need to consider the full complement of information that is necessary for 
market or regulatory action by workers themselves, rather than assuming, 
as much of legal and economic literature does, that mandating the 
transmission of Type A information alone is sufficient.   
C. Additional Necessary Workplace Information: Regulators and Outside 
Interest Groups  
Workers are only one possible actor who might address workplace 
problems. Regulators and outside interest groups may also take market or 
rights-enforcing action, and employers might take affirmative action 
themselves upon learning Type A information about workplace problems. 
Yet these actors, too, need a full complement of context, process, 
incentives, and other actor information, in addition to and on top of Type A 
disclosures. 
As an initial matter, Type A disclosures will often be more important 
to regulators and outside interest groups than to workers and employers, 
who are “insiders” to the employment relationship and thus already know 
about the on-the-ground conditions of the work. To be sure, as discussed 
above, Type A information may be necessary even to insiders when 
aspects of work are hidden, and the very act of making those disclosures 
might also “inform” an employer who previously overlooked or ignored 
those facts.54 But Type A information will have the most importance for 
regulators and outside interest groups, who otherwise will be uninformed 
about most aspects of a job. Here, Estlund’s work on the ways in which 
publically disclosed workplace facts can aid in compliance efforts and 
reputational rewards and sanctions is instructive: she notes that 
government agencies that learn about workplace problems (Type A) can 
take appropriate rights-enforcing action, and that firms can suffer market-
based reputational (and resulting financial) harm when workplace 
problems are exposed to the public.55 
                                                                                                                          
54 Doorey, supra note 19, at 67 (“Disclosure can lead to better-informed actors. It facilitates self-
learning or self-referential fact-finding; a firm that does not know it is engaging in harmful behaviour is 
unlikely to take steps to alter that behaviour.”). 
55 Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 373–74 (“Public disclosure of compliance-related 
information would help to promote compliance by making noncompliance more visible and 
enforcement more likely.”); see also id. at 376–77 (“The aspiration behind these schemes is not merely 
to promote informed consumer decisions, but to improve producers’ performance. For example, the 
point of disclosing fat and calorie content on food labels is not only to inform health-conscious 
consumers but also to shift nutritional demand and supply toward healthier foods. The point of 
disclosing the energy efficiency of appliances and vehicles is not only to inform environmentally and 
economically conscious buyers but also to improve energy efficiency. Similarly, the point of requiring 
firms that emit toxic substances to disclose their emissions is not only to inform communities but also 
to induce firms to reduce emissions.”). 
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Yet, again, Type A information is not enough; other types of 
information are important to regulators and outside interest groups as well. 
Turning first to regulators: government enforcement agencies can be 
assumed to know the substantive law they are charged with enforcing 
(Type B), as well as the process for and costs and benefits of enforcement 
(Types C and D). Type E information then becomes critical, as regulators 
decide how to spend their limited enforcement dollars. If, for example, 
workers themselves have been successfully filing and winning their own 
lawsuits against a group of lawbreaking employers, a regulator might be 
disinclined to engage in enforcement in that particular industry. David 
Weil, Director of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour 
Division, has recommended this very strategy, advocating that regulators 
focus their investigatory and enforcement efforts on “‘fissured’ industries[] 
in which businesses employ high numbers of subcontractors and other 
contingent workers and disclaim any legal responsibility for wages and 
working conditions.”56 Because workers in these industries would face 
significant legal barriers in holding their employers responsible for wage 
and hour violations, Weil has exhorted regulators to step in to fill the 
enforcement void.57 This is an example of Type E information’s spurring a 
rights-enforcing response, where a regulator calibrates its approach to a 
workplace problem according to the independent responses (or lack 
thereof) of other potential enforcement actors. 
Turning next to outside interest groups: consumers, investors, and 
advocacy organizations might engage in their own market or regulatory 
actions, and a different suite of information is necessary for each response. 
On the rights-enforcement track, investors might file suit against a 
corporation’s directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty if the 
company is revealed to be engaging in a pattern and practice of violating 
labor or employment laws. To do so, the investors need to know something 
about the substantive law and legal process as well as the benefits that 
might accrue as a result of such a suit. Likewise, consumers might engage 
in a boycott of a company’s products or services upon revelation of 
damaging Type A information. Again, to do so, they would need 
contextual Type B information to determine whether conditions at the 
target company are atypical, and therefore perhaps vulnerable to public 
pressure, or whether conditions are merely the norm across an industry as a 
whole. 
Finally, as discussed above, employers themselves might be prompted 
                                                                                                                          
56 Alexander & Prasad, supra note 44, at 1117–18 (discussing DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING 
WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR 
DIVISION 18–26 (2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
BH73-UBFD]). 
57 WEIL, supra note 56, at 75–95. 
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by the revelation of Type A information to take affirmative steps to correct 
workplace problems, even in the absence of litigation, regulation, or 
outside group pressure. Again, however, additional information is likely 
necessary to trigger an affirmative employer response. Like all other 
actors, employers need to know something about context (Type B) to 
gauge the relative severity and importance of the disclosed problem. In 
addition, Type E information may be the most influential for employer 
decision-making. If an employer knows that the likelihood of regulator 
enforcement action, a worker lawsuit, mass exodus of workers, a boycott, 
reputational harm, and/or divestment are near nil, then the likelihood of an 
affirmative employer response is also likely to be near nil. Put another 
way, if maintaining sub-legal or sub-market working conditions is 
currently profitable for an employer, and Type E information reveals no 
threat of enforcement or market discipline, then the profit-maximizing 
employer is highly unlikely to make changes on its own. Thus, whether the 
information types described here would result in market or rights-enforcing 
action by any actor is in some ways circular, as any one actor’s response to 
workplace problems depends on its knowledge and prediction of other 
actors’ responses.58 
Therefore, for each actor and each market and rights-enforcing 
response, it is clear that Type A information must be disclosed, but that 
Type A is merely the first of multiple kinds of necessary information. The 
following Part surveys existing workplace transparency mandates in labor 
and employment law—those already identified in the literature and those 
left out—and maps them onto the typology developed in FIGURE 2.   
III.  A SURVEY OF EXISTING TRANSPARENCY MANDATES  
A. Existing Type A Disclosures  
In her work on employer disclosure mandates, Cynthia Estlund 
characterizes “mandatory disclosure [as] a largely unexplored concept in 
the employment field.”59 The three transparency mandates that she does 
identify all require transmission of Type A information: the Hazard 
Communication Standard issued pursuant to the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA), under which employers must inform workers about 
toxins on the job;60 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
                                                                                                                          
58 Unscrupulous employers may in fact manipulate other actors’ likelihood of engaging in a 
rights-enforcing or market response. See, e.g., Sixth Amended Complaint, supra note 34, ¶¶ 7–9, 
(detailing instances of employer threats to prevent worker protests and actions to block workers from 
leaving their jobs). See generally Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and the 
Silencing of the Brown Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779 (2013) (discussing employer threats as 
mechanisms for silencing worker claims). 
59 Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 352. 
60 Id. at 377 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1) (2010)). 
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(ERISA), under which “[e]mployers must disclose the terms of health and 
benefit plans;”61 and pay transparency rules in some areas of federal and 
state employment law that require disclosure of the employer’s wage 
schedule and prohibit retaliation against workers who share information 
about their pay.62   
Professor J.H. Verkerke provides another example of Type A 
information transmission: where an employer’s statements about loyalty 
and job tenure create an expectation of job security, courts in some states 
create a good cause exemption to the doctrine of at-will employment.63 As 
Verkerke explains, the threat that a court might apply this exemption in a 
worker’s wrongful discharge lawsuit can prompt employers to clearly 
disclose employees’ at-will status.64 The threat of the good cause 
exemption acts as a transparency mandate, forcing the employer to reveal 
Type A information about the true extent of the worker’s job security.   
To this list, this Essay adds two more transparency mandates, both of 
which also prompt employers to inform workers of their status and security 
at work. First, the U.S. Department of Labor has proposed a “Right to 
Know” initiative, which would require employers to tell workers whether 
they are classified as employees or independent contractors under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).65 This information is often hidden from 
workers unless and until an employer challenges a worker’s employee 
status as a defense in an FLSA lawsuit. Second, the Worker Adjustment 
                                                                                                                          
61 Id. at 352 n.1. 
62 Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 15, at 784 & n.13 (citing the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1831 (2012), as well as pay transparency laws enacted in 
New York, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(a) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2014), Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 
91E.1–E.6 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.), and Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-
2209, -2214 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.)). President Obama also issued a notice of 
proposed rulemaking in September 2014 that would require pay transparency for federal contractors by 
prohibiting retaliation against those workers who share information about their pay. OFFICE OF FED. 
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: NOTICE OF PROPOSED 
RULEMAKING: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS, PROHIBITIONS AGAINST PAY SECRECY AND ACTIONS 1 
(n.d.), http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/PayTransparencyFactSheet_JRF_QA_508c.pdf [http://perma.cc/H8 
B9-8DGN]. This anti-retaliation approach creates “space” for worker sharing of information about their 
wages and working conditions and mirrors in some ways the NLRA’s concerted activity provision, 
which has been interpreted to protect that space for worker discussion and peer information 
transmission. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (protecting workers’ rights to engage in concerted activity); 
see also Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 929 
(2012) (“[A] different kind of protection—protection from monitoring and surveillance—may be 
necessary before the employee speaks. Employees may need some space to seek information, to 
explore ideas and discuss concerns with others before they are ready to speak in the ways that the law 
most values . . . . If employees are unable to communicate about shared workplace concerns without 
employer scrutiny, collective speech is unlikely ever to emerge.”). 
63 Verkerke, supra note 30, at 925.  
64 Id. at 937. 
65 Right to Know Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2010), http:// 
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/unifiedagenda/fall2010/1235-AA04.htm [http://perma.cc/C2KW-AVZQ].   
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and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) requires that employers provide 
sixty days’ advance notice to workers of impending mass layoffs or plant 
closings.66 Again, a firm might otherwise shield this information from 
discovery in order to maintain investor confidence as long as possible. The 
WARN Act forces disclosure of this Type A information to workers. 
Thus, there are examples of Type A disclosure rules scattered 
throughout employment law that prompt the transmission of information 
about employees’ occupational health risks, pay and benefits, employee 
status, and job security. Each of these disclosures transmits facts that are 
known solely, and sometimes actively hidden, by the employer, and that 
workers are unable to discover independently.     
B. Existing Type B, C, and D Disclosures 
If Estlund is correct that scholars have left Type A workplace 
transparency mandates “largely unexplored,” then they have left the other 
types completely off the scholarly map.67 However, one need only scan the 
walls of break rooms and office kitchens across America to discover 
multiple mandated disclosures about Type B, C, and D information: 
posters and notices that inform workers of their substantive rights under 
various labor and employment laws, the process for making a claim, and 
protections against retaliation. Many employers also provide anti-
harassment materials to workers (Type B) and create and disseminate 
information about internal complaint procedures (Type C). 
Almost no scholarly attention has been paid to these ubiquitous 
examples of workplace information transmission, despite their essential 
role, as explained in Part II, in building on Type A information to trigger 
rights-enforcing or market responses to workplace problems. Accordingly, 
this Part presents an in-depth examination of three instances of Type B–D 
workplace information transmission: the FLSA break room poster, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) remedial notice, and employers’ 
anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures. Each of these informs 
workers of their substantive legal rights, rights-enforcement procedures, 
and incentives for rights-enforcement action, and also puts employers 
themselves on notice.68 The end of this Part turns from the regulatory to the 
market track, briefly examining the forms that Type B–D information 
                                                                                                                          
66 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2012).   
67 Indeed, Estlund acknowledges the problem that “[e]mployees may also lack important 
information about the law of the workplace,” but “set[s] that problem aside.” Estlund, Just the Facts, 
supra note 15, at 363 n.42.  
68 This Part focuses exclusively on workers and, to a lesser extent, employers, leaving out a 
discussion of disclosure of Type B–D information to regulators and outside interest groups. As 
discussed above, these actors are less likely to be in need of Type B–D disclosures, as they already 
have access to those sets of information. 
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might take in the context of a market response to the disclosure of a 
workplace problem. 
1. The FLSA Break Room Poster  
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) requires employers to display up 
to eleven different posters covering a range of topics from polygraph 
protection to migrant farmworkers’ rights; other federal and state agencies 
require additional or different disclosures. 69 This Part focuses on one of the 
eleven: the FLSA poster concerning workers’ rights under the statute, the 
current version of which is included as FIGURE 3 in the Appendix.   
All employers covered by the FLSA have been required to display a 
poster describing workers’ wage and hour rights since 1949.70 The poster 
                                                                                                                          
69 Poster Page: Workplace Poster Requirements for Small Businesses and Other Employers, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR [hereinafter Poster Page], http://www.dol.gov/oasam/boc/osdbu/sbrefa/poster/ 
matrix.htm [http://perma.cc/X6A2-Z6ZV] (last visited July 27, 2015); see also Peter D. DeChiara, The 
Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 433 (1995) (discussing federal and state agency poster 
requirements); Joseph H. McFarlane, Note, Poster Wars: The NLRB and the Controversy over an 11-
by-17-Inch Piece of Paper, 38 J. CORP. L. 421, 429 (2013) (discussing federal and state agency poster 
requirements). Notably, there is no requirement that employers hang a poster describing workers’ rights 
under the NLRA; this omission, and the NLRB’s attempt to rectify it, is discussed at length in Part IV, 
infra. 
70 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (2014) (“Every employer employing any employees subject to the Act's 
minimum wage provisions shall post and keep posted a notice explaining the Act, as prescribed by the 
Wage and Hour Division, in conspicuous places in every establishment where such employees are 
employed so as to permit them to observe readily a copy. Any employer of employees to whom section 
7 of the Act does not apply because of an exemption of broad application to an establishment may alter 
or modify the poster with a legible notation to show that the overtime provisions do not apply. For 
example: Overtime Provisions Not Applicable to Taxicab Drivers (section 13(b)(17)).”). The FLSA 
poster requirement had its genesis in Industry Wage Orders, which under the original 1938 version of 
the FLSA were used to set minimum wages on a per-industry basis “to phase low-wage industries into 
the minimum statutory wage.” Wage and Hour Division Economic Report for American Samoa 
Industry Committee No. 26, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/as/sec1.htm 
[http://perma.cc/Q6FU-ZF5D] (last visited July 27, 2015). These orders often “included a requirement 
that employers post appropriate notices [of the FLSA’s requirements] in conspicuous places where 
covered employees are working.” Posting of Notices, 14 Fed. Reg. 7516, 7516 (Dec. 16, 1949). In 
1949, drawing on “the accumulated experience of the [DOL’s Wage and Hour] Division over a period 
of more than 11 years,” the DOL issued a uniform workplace poster rule that required every employer 
covered by the FLSA to “post and keep posted such notices pertaining to the applicability of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act as shall be prescribed by the Division, in conspicuous places in every 
establishment where such employees are employed so as to permit them to readily observe a copy on 
the way to or from their place of employment.” Id. Curiously, DOL regulations establish no “citation or 
penalty for failure to post,” Poster Page, supra note 69, but some courts have held that an employer’s 
failure to display the poster can warrant tolling of the FLSA’s statute of limitations, see, e.g., Asp v. 
Milardo Photography, 573 F. Supp. 2d 677, 698 (D. Conn. 2008) (collecting cases and concluding that 
“the trend regarding the failure to post FLSA notices . . . permits equitable tolling where the plaintiff 
did not consult with counsel during his employment and the employer’s failure to post notice is not in 
dispute”); Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00 C 6320, 2002 WL 31175471, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
30, 2002) (“Accordingly, this court holds that an employer's failure to post the notice required by 29 
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states the applicable federal minimum wage in large type at the top, and in 
smaller type below describes workers’ rights concerning overtime pay, 
child labor, and proper payment methods for tipped employees (Type B 
information). The poster also discusses the process for enforcing the 
FLSA, but, oddly, focuses primarily on the DOL’s ability to bring FLSA 
lawsuits, leaving out information about workers’ own ability to file 
lawsuits (Type C information) and the double damages and attorneys’ fees 
they might collect if victorious (Type D).71 In addition, the poster contains 
a single line discussing protections against retaliation, another Type D fact 
that might influence a worker’s assessment of her incentives to engage in 
rights enforcement: “The law also prohibits discriminating against or 
discharging workers who file a complaint or participate in any proceeding 
under the Act.”72 
The DOL’s original justification for the poster explicitly linked greater 
worker knowledge of their substantive legal rights to better enforcement of 
the law: 
It has been found that effective enforcement of the act 
depends to a great extent upon knowledge on the part of 
covered employees of the provisions of the act and the 
applicability of such provisions to them, and a greater degree 
of compliance with the act has been effected in situations 
where employees are aware of their rights under the law.73 
The DOL went on to describe well-informed workers as a “necessary 
adjunct to proper enforcement of the statutory provisions.”74    
Thus, break room posters appear to be designed to function 
prophylactically, to provide Type B–D information to workers and 
simultaneously remind employers of their legal obligations.75 Remedial 
notices ordered by the NLRB, explored next, are more of an antidote than a 
prophylactic, designed as an ex post corrective for employer misbehavior. 
Despite this difference, however, the NLRB remedial notice also transmits 
context, process, and incentives information to both workers and 
employers.  
                                                                                                                          
C.F.R. § 516.4 tolls the limitations period until the employee acquires a general awareness of his rights 
under the FLSA.”). 
71 Employee Rights Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Poster, U.S. DEP’T OF  
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/posters/minwagebwp.pdf [http://perma.cc/46GD-
K3KQ] (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
72 Id. 
73 Posting of Notices, 14 Fed. Reg. 7516, 7516 (Dec. 16, 1949) (emphasis added).  
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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2. The NLRB Remedial Notice 
Though there is presently no universal requirement that employers 
display a break room poster describing workers’ labor rights, a subject 
revisited in Part IV below, employers who commit unfair labor practices 
are routinely ordered by the National Labor Relations Board to post a 
remedial notice.76 This notice, a sample of which appears as FIGURE 4 in 
the Appendix, informs workers of their substantive rights to organize into a 
union and bargain collectively (Type B information), the contact 
information for the local NLRB compliance officer (Type C), and the 
employer’s promise not to retaliate against any worker who exercises her 
labor rights (Type D).77 Similar remedial notices are required by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the event of OSHA 
violations.78  
From the early days of their usage, NLRB remedial notices have been 
described as a corrective for workers’ lack of knowledge about their labor 
                                                                                                                          
76 NLRB v. Penn. Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 268 (1938) (affirming the NLRB’s power to 
require remedial notice posting); In re J & R Flooring, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372, at *2 
(Oct. 22, 2010) (“The requirement that respondents post a notice informing employees of their rights 
under the Act, the violations found by the Board, the respondent’s undertaking to cease and desist from 
such unlawful conduct in the future, and the affirmative action to be taken by the respondent to redress 
the violations has been an essential element of the Board’s remedies for unfair labor practices since the 
earliest cases under the [National Labor Relations] Act.”); Leonard R. Page, NLRB Remedies: Where 
Are They Going?, LAWMEMO (Apr. 10, 2000),  http://www.lawmemo.com/nlrb/remedies.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/V7MP-ZYKF] (“The Board's practice of including notice postings in its remedial orders dates 
back to the Board's inception.”). 
77 A typical NLRB remedial notice, such as the one shown in the Appendix, must be posted 
conspicuously for sixty days, both physically in the workplace and electronically by email and posting 
on internet and intranet sites. J & R Flooring, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372, at *4 (“In 
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by 
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic means, if the Respondent 
customarily communicates with its employees [members] by such means.”). In some circumstances, 
courts also require employers to read the notice aloud to their workforce and mail a copy to each 
worker. Federated Logistics & Operations v. NLRB, 400 F.3d 920, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(discussing the “particularized need” standard for compelling the public reading of a NLRB remedial 
order). Remedial notices must be signed by a representative of the employer and customarily state 
workers’ rights under the NLRA, as well as the employer’s pledge to respect those rights in the future 
and cease any wrongdoing. J & R Flooring, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372, at *4 (discussing 
remedial “notices to employees concerning the violations found by the Board, the remedies ordered, 
and the underlying rights of the employees”); id. at *6 (requiring an “indication that the notice has been 
duly signed”).    
78 29 C.F.R. § 1903.16(a) (2013) (“Upon receipt of any citation under the Act, the employer shall 
immediately post such citation, or a copy thereof, unedited, at or near each place an alleged violation 
referred to in the citation occurred . . . .”); see also, e.g., Citation and Notification of Penalty, Bostik, 
Inc., Inspection No. 315298307 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 12, 2011) (on file with author) (describing 
citations, penalties, posting requirements, and workers’ rights: “The law prohibits discrimination by an 
employer against an employee for filing a complaint or for exercising any rights under this Act. An 
employee who believes that he/she has been discriminated against may file a complaint no later than 30 
days after the discrimination occurred with the U.S. Department of Labor Area Office at the address 
shown above.”). 
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rights (Type B information) and protections against retaliation (Type D). In 
1940, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court described the NLRB’s 
“purpose” in requiring a remedial notice as increasing workers’ 
“knowledge of a guarantee of an unhampered right in the future to 
determine their own labor affiliation.”79 The Court went on to expound on 
the role of information in the project of enforcing workers’ labor rights: 
Knowledge on the part of the men that the company would 
cease and desist from hampering, interfering with and 
coercing them in selection of a bargaining agent . . . was 
essential if the employees were to feel free to exercise their 
rights without incurring the company’s disfavor.80  
Lower courts have similarly noted the ability of the remedial notice to 
educate workers about their substantive labor rights and especially to 
correct employer-created misinformation. The Seventh Circuit has 
commented, for example, that “requiring an employer to post a notice will 
carry significant impact in informing employees of their rights and 
effectuating the policies of the Act,”81 while the Fifth Circuit has described 
forced notice-posting as “let[ting] . . . a warming wind of information and, 
more important, reassurance” into a workplace that has been “chilled” by 
employers’ unfair labor practices.82 Remedial notices, like break room 
posters, are therefore rooted in the concept that forcing the transmission of 
Type B–D information—informing workers of their labor rights, the 
process for enforcement, and their protections against retaliation—will 
result in greater enforcement of and compliance with labor law. 
3. Anti-Harassment Policies and Complaint Procedures 
Many employers inform workers about their firms’ anti-harassment 
policies, including the rights and prohibitions of employment law (Type B 
information); many have also devised internal complaint procedures for 
workers to report instances of discrimination or harassment (Type C). 
Some states, such as California,83 affirmatively require these forms of 
information transmission. Even in the absence of a mandate, employers 
                                                                                                                          
79 NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 462 (1940).  
80 Id. 
81 NLRB v. Methodist Hosp. of Gary, 733 F.2d 43, 48 (7th Cir. 1984); see also NLRB v. Gen. 
Thermodynamics, 670 F.2d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The Board could reasonably conclude that 
requiring respondent to post a notice regarding the change in its solicitation and distribution rule will 
carry more impact in informing employees of their rights and effectuating the policies of the Act than 
the respondent's muted removal of the rules from the bulletin boards.”). 
82 J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 1969). A former NLRB General 
Counsel has stated similarly, “The Board notice serves an important purpose: it describes their rights to 
employees and reassures them that these rights will be vindicated.” Page, supra note 76. 
83 See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 322 of 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(describing what information employers must provide their employees).  
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may be strongly incentivized to engage in information disclosure in order 
to gain access to a defense to certain types of Title VII hostile work 
environment claims: the Ellerth/ Faragher defense.84   
The Ellerth/ Faragher defense takes its name from two Supreme Court 
decisions that were issued on the same day in 1998.85 Both involved hostile 
work environment sexual harassment claims, in which a supervisor 
committed harassment and the plaintiff sought to hold the employer itself 
vicariously liable under Title VII.86 The Court held that employers in these 
circumstances can defend themselves by showing that they “exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior,” and, additionally, that the plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer.”87 The Court noted further that “an antiharassment policy with 
complaint procedure” is one form that the employer’s preventative efforts 
might take.88  
Taking this language as their starting point, lower courts have 
considered what might count as a sufficient antiharassment policy for 
Ellerth/ Faragher purposes. Courts tend to ask two questions. First, what is 
the substance of the employer’s policy?89 Second, how is the policy 
disseminated?90 With respect to substance, courts look favorably on 
policies that “define[] sexual harassment, [give] specific examples of 
sexual harassment, and set forth a statement that retaliation would not be 
tolerated.”91 Though courts do not require antiharassment policies to be 
                                                                                                                          
84 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775 (1998). Indeed, the line between mandated and incentivized behavior may be blurrier than it first 
appears. One is never truly required to comply with the law, only incentivized to avoid the 
consequences of law-breaking.  
85 Both cases were decided on June 26, 1998. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775. 
86 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746–47 (“We decide whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 an employee who refuses the unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet 
suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the employer without showing the 
employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor's actions.” (citation omitted)); Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 780 (“This case calls for identification of the circumstances under which an employer may 
be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the acts of a supervisory employee 
whose sexual harassment of subordinates has created a hostile work environment amounting to 
employment discrimination.” (citation omitted)). 
87 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.  
88 Id. at 765, 773. 
89 See id. at 765 (“[T]he need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may 
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.”). 
90 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (stating that the employer city was unable to raise an affirmative 
defense because it failed to disseminate its sexual harassment policy). 
91 Taylor v. CSX Transp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1304 (M.D. Ala. 2006); see also McGriff v. Am. 
Airlines, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1155 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (stating with approval that “American has 
offered as evidence a copy of its Policy Statement, which expresses American's commitment to 
providing a workplace free of unlawful harassment and which provides a listing of protected traits as 
well as a non-exhaustive list of the forms unlawful harassment might take.”). 
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couched in terms of workers’ legal rights as such, many policies appear to 
use the language of law and rights. For example, a policy described by the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi stated the 
employer’s goal of providing “a working environment in which employees 
are free from discomfort or pressure resulting from jokes, ridicule, slurs, 
threats and harassment relating to race, color, gender, sexual orientation, 
gender identity, religion, national origin, age, disability, veteran status or 
other legally protected characteristics.”92 Similarly, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) guidance on the content 
of antiharassment policies recommends that employers “inform[] 
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment 
under [T]itle VII.”93 Thus, policies developed in reaction to Ellerth and 
Faragher often become vehicles for transmission of Type B information 
about workers’ legal rights.  
With respect to the dissemination of antiharassment policies, courts 
favor policies that may be accessed easily by employees in places where 
they congregate, such as a “crew room” and on a company’s intranet and 
“employee bulletin boards.”94 If a policy is contained in a lengthy 
employee handbook, then it must be clearly identified and easily locatable 
via a table of contents.95 And in Faragher itself, the Supreme Court noted 
the district court’s finding that, while the defendant had an antiharassment 
policy, it was functionally ineffective because it was never disseminated to 
employees.96 
Taken as a whole, then, courts’ interpretations of Ellerth and 
Faragher, along with EEOC guidance, signal to employers that a robust 
antiharassment policy, with a clear explanation of prohibited conduct 
(Type B information), procedural instructions for claims-making (Type C), 
and protections against retaliation (Type D), effectively publicized to 
workers, is the best way to gain access to an affirmative defense to 
                                                                                                                          
92 Davis v. River Region Health Sys., 903 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (emphasis 
added). 
93 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2013) (emphasis added). 
94 See Atwell v. Smart Ala., LLC, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (“The Court 
finds sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant's sexual 
harassment policy was effective and was disseminated. The policy was in the employee handbook, 
which was distributed to all employees during training. Managers were also given annual training in the 
policy. The policy was posted on employee bulletin boards.”); Taylor, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1304–05 
(discussing posting in a crew room). 
95 Bush v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., No. 06-1110 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 1321853, at *5 (D. 
Minn. May 4, 2007) (“More importantly, however, the Handbook's table of contents provides the 
specific page where Penske's policy on harassment may be found.”). 
96 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998) (“The District Court found that the 
City had entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees 
and that its officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors like [the ones in this 
instance].”). 
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vicarious liability. Though the Supreme Court did not rely on a 
transparency rationale for its decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, the 
availability of the affirmative defense nevertheless has information-
transmitting effects, as employers opt to create and disseminate anti-
harassment policies rather than suffer the alternative of proceeding 
defenseless through litigation.97 
4. Type B, C, and D Information on the Market Track 
Thus far, this Part has surveyed existing transparency mandates that 
force the transmission of Type B–D information in the context of a 
worker’s rights-enforcing response to a disclosed workplace problem. 
Turning to the market track, it is more difficult to identify requirements 
that force employers to disclose job openings (Type B information), job 
qualifications and the process for applying (Type C), and the range of 
transaction and opportunity costs involved with job switching (Type D). 
Certain employer-sponsored visa programs, such as the H-2A visa for 
temporary agricultural workers and the H-2B visa for other foreign 
workers, do require that employers advertise their job openings locally 
before filling the positions with foreign visa-holders.98 Likewise, federal 
law requires that housing developers who receive funds from the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) advertise their 
jobs to members of the communities in which the housing is being 
constructed.99   
Each of these mandates forces employers to disclose Type B and C 
information about job availability and processes, which could then enable 
workers at other firms to identify and assess alternative jobs that may 
prove to be a better match than their current employment. However, these 
mandates are limited in scope, applying only to visa-sponsoring employers 
and those who receive HUD funding. Indeed, there is no labor market-wide 
job bank that a worker might consult upon learning Type A information 
that would supply all layers of information necessary for her to engage in a 
job-switching market response to a workplace problem. 
                                                                                                                          
97 Nor has the law review literature identified the information-transmitting nature of Ellerth and 
Faragher, focusing in large part instead on whether the antiharassment policies prompted by those two 
decisions are effective in enabling workers’ complaints and reducing workplace harassment. See, e.g., 
Tanya Katerí Hernández, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & 
the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2006) (“The statistical analysis 
of survey responses from a group of 120 female sexual harassment victims suggests that White women 
and Women of Color may differ in their uses of internal complaint procedures.”); Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Employment Law As Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2715–21 (2008) (providing an example of 
collective action attempts after incidents of harassment). This Essay considers these same questions of 
effectiveness—as applied to all forms of workplace transparency mandates—in Part IV.B, infra. 
98 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.150–.158 (2010) (describing job advertisement requirements for the H-
2A visa program); 20 C.F.R. § 655.10 (2015) (same for H-2B visa program). 
99 12 U.S.C. § 1701u(c)(2) (2012). 
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C. Nonexistent Type E Disclosures 
Finally, what about Type E information about the probability and 
magnitude of other actors’ rights-enforcing and market responses to an 
employer’s sub-legal or sub-market practices? As discussed above, this 
information type is likely the most important for spurring employers to 
take affirmative steps to correct workplace problems, even prior to or in 
the absence of regulation or market discipline by other actors. In other 
words, an employer who has accurate Type A–D information about a 
workplace problem might correctly gauge her exposure to legal liability or 
to a mass departure of workers. She might then be motivated to make 
changes even before a lawsuit is filed or workers walk out. If, however, the 
employer is secure in the Type E knowledge that her workers lack the 
information and incentives to sue, or that regulatory action or outside 
interest group pressure is highly unlikely, then even the most well-
informed and knowledgeable employers may allow workplace problems to 
persist. 
Yet there is no existing transparency mandate that requires the various 
actors identified by this Essay to reveal their own intentions to engage in 
rights-enforcing or market activity to address disclosed workplace 
problems. In fact, regulatory agencies may desire to keep that information 
quiet, so as to catch scofflaw employers off guard rather than tip them off 
to impending investigations and enforcement actions. Thus, because of its 
contingent nature, this information type may not be susceptible to 
transmission. It is nevertheless a key component of the typology of 
workplace information, as, in the end, an employer’s knowledge of the 
likelihood of rights enforcement or market discipline may be a significant 
predictor of whether change occurs at that workplace. 
IV.  FIRST AMENDMENT AND LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES:  
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
This Part turns from the theoretical briefly to the practical, cataloging 
some challenges and questions associated with workplace transparency 
mandates. If each of the five types of information identified by this Essay 
were to be made available to workers, regulators, and outside interest 
groups, what would that look like? Who would be required to provide the 
information, to whom, in what form, and under what legal authority? 
Moreover, what questions should we ask to determine whether workplace 
transparency mandates actually accomplish their first-order goals of 
transmitting information and their second-order goals of triggering rights-
enforcing and market responses? This Part begins to sketch out these 
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questions. A subsequent article attempts to answer them.100 
A. The Constitutionality of Workplace Transparency Mandates 
The first, and perhaps most important, set of threshold questions 
associated with workplace transparency mandates concerns their 
constitutionality. Indeed, the First Amendment may be implicated 
whenever the government compels a private entity to speak, or to adopt or 
display the speech of another (e.g., the hazard warnings, pay transparency 
rules, and workplace posters and notices described above).101    
Historically, the constitutionality of break room posters and remedial 
notices—transmissions of Type B–D information—seems simply to have 
been assumed by courts. In the only case that decided a First Amendment 
challenge to a break room poster, Lake Butler Apparel v. Secretary of 
Labor,102 an employer refused, on free speech grounds, “to post the 
standard [Occupational Safety and Health Act] poster informing the 
employees of their safety rights under the Act.”103 The Fifth Circuit 
dismissed the employer’s argument as out of hand, calling it “seemingly 
nonsensical” and concluding that “if the government has a right to 
promulgate these regulations it seems obvious that they have a right to 
statutorily require that they be posted in a place that would be obvious to 
the intended beneficiaries of the statute.”104 The court further held: 
The posting of the notice does not by any stretch of the 
imagination reflect one way or the other on the views of the 
employer. It merely states what the law requires. The 
employer may differ with the wisdom of the law and this 
requirement even to the point as done here, of challenging its 
validity. . . . But the First Amendment which gives him the 
full right to contest validity to the bitter end cannot justify his 
refusal to post a notice Congress thought to be essential.105 
                                                                                                                          
100 Alexander, supra note 22. 
101 See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (“Just as the First 
Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the 
government from compelling individuals to express certain views, or from compelling certain 
individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.” (citations omitted)); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n 
of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (“In reaching our conclusion, we relied on the principle 
that ‘[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the 
broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind’ . . . .” (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 
(1977))). 
102 519 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); see also McFarlane, supra note 69, at 430 (“The NLRB notes that 
it ‘is unaware of any challenge to the Labor Department's authority to promulgate or enforce the FLSA 
notice requirement, which has been in effect for over 60 years.’”).  
103 Lake Butler Apparel, 519 F.2d at 85. 
104 Id. at 89. 
105 Id. 
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With respect to NLRB remedial notices, it is clear that the NLRA has 
extremely broad remedial powers to correct past employer misfeasance, 
and in that connection may force employers to post the sorts of remedial 
notices examined in this Essay. The NLRB may even force employers 
personally to read such notices to their assembled workforce, in order to 
“dispel the atmosphere of intimidation created in large part by [the 
employer’s] own statements and actions.”106 Moreover, in the only roughly 
similar case to have considered a challenge to OSHA’s remedial notice-
posting requirement, the Tenth Circuit rejected an employer’s argument 
that such a notice violated its constitutional rights by “forc[ing] it to vilify 
and publish at its own expense the respondent's unproved accusations.”107   
Finally, in a case that did not take on First Amendment questions 
directly, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless observed that “an employer’s [First 
Amendment] right to silence is sharply constrained in the labor context, 
and leaves it subject to a variety of burdens to post notices of rights and 
risks.”108 The Second Circuit has elaborated on this point, noting with 
respect to the NLRA in particular that “the employer’s entitlement to free 
speech is not categorical, but limited by the NLRA concept of coercion; to 
avoid [anti-union] coercion[,] . . . the NLRB can limit the content of 
employer speech more severely than would be permissible if the NLRA 
rights of the employees were not simultaneously affected.”109  
Despite this seemingly settled precedent, the constitutionality of the 
break room poster was thrown back into contention recently in a 2013 D.C. 
Circuit decision that struck down the NLRB’s attempt to institute a 
workplace poster requirement.110 Previously, the NLRA had been almost 
unique among federal workplace rights statutes in its lack of a poster 
requirement.111 In enacting a new poster rule, the NLRB referred to 
                                                                                                                          
106 United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1344, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (quoting Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1386–87 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); see also Federated 
Logistics & Operations v. NLRB, 400 F.3d 920, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing the strong anti-union 
campaign by the corporation). 
107 Stockwell Mfg. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306, 1309–10 (10th Cir. 1976); cf. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–16 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding OSHA hazard labeling requirements of the 
sort examined by Viscusi and in Part II, supra, in the face of a First Amendment challenge). 
108 UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
109  Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2006). 
110 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in part by Am. 
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Another employers’ group sued 
the NLRB in the Fourth Circuit, which also invalidated the poster rule, but on the ground that the 
NLRB had exceeded its authority in issuing the rule. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 
152 (4th Cir. 2013). For a discussion of both cases, see Charles J. Morris, Notice-Posting of Employee 
Rights: NLRB Rulemaking and the Upcoming Backfire, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2529699. 
111 See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 
54,006, 54,018 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (explaining new rule requiring 
employers subject to the NLRA to post notices informing their employees of their rights under the 
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workers’ lack of Type B information about their labor rights and the 
necessity of addressing this information deficit in order to spur rights 
enforcement.112 In National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB (NAM 
I), however, the D.C. Circuit blocked the poster rule.113 The decision is a 
statutory one—interpreting a provision of the NLRA—but with strong 
constitutional overtones and heavy reliance on First Amendment case law. 
The remainder of this Part explains the NAM I opinion and begins to map 
out its significance for the constitutionality of other workplace 
transparency mandates.    
The crux of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in NAM I is the protection 
provided to employers by section 8(c) of the NLRA. That section reads in 
its entirety: 
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the 
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or 
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair 
labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, 
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or 
promise of benefit.114 
Thus, under this section, an employer’s speech may not be deemed an 
unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA unless the speech is 
coercive.115 The NLRB’s new poster rule, however, rendered an 
employer’s failure to display the poster an unfair labor practice in two 
ways: the failure itself could be judged an unfair labor practice,116 and the 
failure could also be used as evidence of an employer’s anti-union animus 
to bolster charges of other, separate unfair labor practices.117   
The interpretive task for the D.C. Circuit, then, was to determine 
whether an employer’s refusal to display the NLRB’s poster amounted to 
speech that was protected by section 8(c) against penalty as an unfair labor 
practice. NAM I is therefore not a true First Amendment case, as the 
                                                                                                                          
NLRA). 
112 Id. at 54,018 n.96 (“[E]ven if only 10 percent of workers were unaware of those rights, that 
would still mean that more than 10 million workers lacked knowledge of one of their most basic 
workplace rights. The Board believes that there is no question that at least a similar percentage of 
employees are unaware of the rights explained in the notice. In the Board's view, that justifies issuing 
the rule.”).  
113 NAM I, 717 F.3d at 959. 
114 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012). 
115 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969) (defining coercive and noncoercive 
speech for purposes of the NLRA). 
116 29 C.F.R. § 104.210 (2014) (“Failure to post the employee notice may be found to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by NLRA Section 7, 29 
U.S.C. 157, in violation of NLRA Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1).”). 
117 Id. § 104.214(b) (“The Board may consider a knowing and willful refusal to comply with the 
requirement to post the employee notice as evidence of unlawful motive in a case in which motive is an 
issue.”). 
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plaintiffs did not claim that the poster requirement infringed directly on 
their free speech rights guaranteed by the Constitution; employers’ 
obligations to hang government-provided and required posters had, after 
all, been affirmed uncontroversially in cases like Lake Butler.   
However, the D.C. Circuit’s guidance in determining whether an 
employer’s non-compliance with the poster requirement was an act of 
expression protected by section 8(c) came wholly from First Amendment 
case law. The court determined that the First Amendment protects against 
compelled speech, and that section 8(c) does as well: “Like the freedom of 
speech guaranteed in the First Amendment, § 8(c) necessarily protects—as 
against the Board—the right of employers . . . not to speak.”118 Because the 
NLRB, by virtue of its poster requirement, “selected the message and 
ordered its citizens to convey that message,”119 the poster amounted to 
compelled speech. The fact that the poster “merely recites” workers’ rights 
under established statutory law to organize into a union and bargain 
collectively did not save the poster regulation; the court appeared to credit 
the plaintiffs’ contention that the poster presented a “one-sided,” 
employee-friendly depiction of labor law that interfered with employers’ 
right to express their own anti-union opinions.120 On these grounds, the 
D.C. Circuit struck down the poster requirement.  
Notwithstanding the explicitly statutory nature of the NAM I 
opinion,121 subsequent cases have cited it for the proposition that break 
room poster requirements infringe on employers’ free speech rights 
generally, without restriction to the specific protections offered by section 
8(c).122 In fact, after NAM I, the National Association of Manufacturers 
filed a copycat suit (NAM II) against the Department of Labor, making a 
direct First Amendment challenge to an Obama Administration Executive 
Order requiring federal contractors to post substantially the same labor 
rights poster that was at issue in NAM I.123 The NAM II court held that the 
poster requirement did not amount to compelled speech in violation of the 
employers’ First Amendment rights, distinguishing NAM I’s statutory 
                                                                                                                          
118 NAM I, 717 F.3d at 959.  
119 Id. at 957. 
120 Id. at 957–58. 
121 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“NAM [I] in 
fact did not apply the First Amendment at all, but rested instead on 29 U.S.C. § 158(c), which, it 
carefully explained, goes significantly beyond merely incorporating the First Amendment.”).  
122 E.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing NAM I 
as “concluding that ordering companies themselves to display certain information on their premises 
violates ‘[t]he right against compelled speech’ even if that information is non-ideological” (quoting 
NAM I, 717 F.3d at 957)). 
123 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Perez, No. 1:13-CV-01998 (APM), 2015 WL 2148230 (D.D.C. May 7, 
2015). 
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holding.124 Nevertheless, as employment and constitutional law scholar 
Helen Norton points out, “The [NAM I] court’s broad view of employers’ 
speech rights suggests a willingness to find other employer disclosure 
requirements—including other statutory notice-posting requirements—to 
violate the First Amendment.”125  
A separate article engages in a full constitutional analysis of these 
questions.126 However, some preliminary observations are in order. In a 
settled line of cases stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,127 courts have applied rational 
basis review and upheld a range of government regulations requiring 
companies to disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial” information 
about their products and services.128 Because these regulations concern 
non-ideological commercial speech, they do not warrant the strict scrutiny 
normally applied in First Amendment cases, and because the agencies that 
promulgated the regulations can typically advance a rational state interest 
for forcing this information, the regulations usually withstand First 
Amendment challenge.129 The labeling and disclosure requirements at issue 
in this line of cases provide classic Type A information to consumers about 
the contents and quality of products and services.130 The information at 
issue in NAM I and NAM II, however, was Type B–D information about 
workers’ substantive legal rights and the processes and incentives for 
enforcement.   
In NAM I, the NLRB attempted to analogize its poster requirement 
with the purely factual Type A labeling and disclosure requirements upheld 
                                                                                                                          
124 Id. at *5 (“Plaintiffs argue that NAM 's discussion of the First Amendment inexorably leads to 
the conclusion that the Posting Rule at issue here abridges their members' First Amendment speech 
rights. But NAM does not carry the constitutional weight that Plaintiffs ascribe to it. As Plaintiffs 
conceded at oral argument, NAM did not announce a First Amendment holding.”). 
125 Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment 
15 (Aug. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
126 Alexander, supra note 22. 
127 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
128 Id. at 651.  
129 See Blasi, supra note 15, at 126–29 (detailing cases in which courts found that agencies 
sufficiently advanced rational state interests to justify regulations concerning non-ideological 
commercial speech). In Zauderer itself, the regulation at issue was designed to provide information to 
prevent consumer deception by a commercial speaker. 471 U.S. at 651. Lower courts, however, have 
expanded Zauderer’s application of rational basis review beyond contexts involving deception only. 
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“To the extent that other 
cases in this circuit may be read as . . . limiting Zauderer to cases in which the government points to an 
interest in correcting deception, we now overrule them.”).  
130 Blasi, supra note 15, at 128–29 (collecting cases upholding rules “requiring disclosure of 
mercury in products or packaging, caloric content information in restaurant menus and menu boards, 
fee arrangements in advertising for legal services, information concerning the public impact of storm 
water discharges by municipal storm operators, and notice of a preliminary injunction to be posted on 
the website of a company engaged in suspect tax advice” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
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in the Zauderer line of cases.131 The plaintiffs objected to this contention, 
arguing that the NLRB’s description of workers’ labor rights was slanted 
and inherently ideological.132 Though the D.C. Circuit appeared to credit 
the plaintiffs’ argument,133 it offered no explanation or guidance about 
where to draw the line between ideological and “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” statements of the law. 
Indeed, the position adopted by the plaintiffs in the NAM I case and 
tacitly endorsed by the D.C. Circuit raises more questions than it answers. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, one might imagine that in the NAM I 
plaintiffs’ view, there can never be a “factual” Type B statement of the law 
that is completely neutral, short of a verbatim recitation of statutory or 
regulatory text. The process of summarizing necessarily involves editorial 
judgment about which provisions are more and less important, which is, of 
course, guided by the editor’s ideological beliefs. Similarly, the act of 
paraphrasing to make legal language accessible to more readers might be 
an ideological act in and of itself, as it presupposes a belief that legal 
knowledge should be available even to those who do not have access to a 
lawyer to translate and interpret.  
Given these implications of the NAM I plaintiffs’ position, then, the 
constitutional status of the existing statements of employment law 
contained in the numerous posters that hang on break room walls around 
the country may be called into question. In a bright spot for workplace 
transparency mandates, however, the NAM II court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
contention that the poster’s “slanted” characterization of labor law 
constituted a First Amendment violation.134 According to the NAM II court, 
“when the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices;”135 
thus, “even if the [labor rights] Notice is incomplete, the decision to omit 
certain rights to effectuate a presidential policy decision does not offend 
the First Amendment.”136   
 
                                                                                                                          
131 NAM I, 717 F.3d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The poster, the Board’s acting general counsel 
tells us, merely recites the employee rights set forth in the National Labor Relations Act (and in court 
and Board interpretations of the Act). And so, the argument goes, this case is unlike Barnette or 
Wooley because the Board’s message is ‘non-ideological.’”); id. at 959 n.18 (describing NLRB’s 
citation to Zauderer). 
132 Id. at 958 (describing plaintiffs’ portrayal of the poster as “one-sided, as favoring 
unionization”). 
133 Id. (raising concern that plaintiffs’ accommodation of the NLRB’s poster would affect the 
plaintiffs’ own expression of their message). 
134 NAM II, No. 1:13-CV-01998 (APM), 2015 WL 2148230, at *8 (D.D.C. May 7, 2015). 
135 Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
136 Id. 
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B. But Does Any of This Actually Work? 
Beyond constitutionality, there is another set of basic, unanswered 
threshold questions about workplace transparency mandates: Do they 
actually work? Specifically, do transparency mandates accomplish their 
first-order task of transmitting information to their target audiences? Do 
they accomplish their second-order task of triggering regulatory and 
market responses to correct workplace problems?137 If not, how might they 
be revised to better accomplish their goals? 
With respect to the first-order goal of achieving information 
transmission, scholars in many disciplines have written extensively about 
the problems associated with cognitive bias, which can prevent people 
from fully understanding and appreciating disclosed information.138 
Moreover, if a worker does not take sufficient notice of an information 
disclosure,139 or does not read or understand the language in which the 
workplace information is delivered, then the information may never reach 
its intended audience. For example, though farmworkers are now required 
by the Worker Protection Standard of the Environmental Protection Act to 
be informed about occupational exposure to pesticides, worker advocates 
report that hazard warnings are often available only in English and 
Spanish, while farmworkers increasingly speak only the indigenous 
languages of Mexico and Central America.140 
Moreover, anecdotal accounts abound about the ineffectiveness of 
break room posters: their very ubiquity may mean that they tend to fade 
into the background of the workplace. For example, in the rulemaking 
process concerning the NLRB’s now-defeated break room poster 
                                                                                                                          
137 As Viscusi and Magat put it, “[T]he relevant question for evaluating information programs 
such as hazard warnings is whether they induce behavioral changes in the desired direction and of 
sufficient magnitude to remedy the information problem.” VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 9.  
138 See Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 391 (“Of course, information may not be useful 
given its complexity, its sheer quantity, its presentation, or because of cognitive biases.”); see also 
VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 1–41 (discussing “[i]nformation [p]rocessing and [i]ndividual 
[d]ecisions” and “[c]ognitive [c]onsiderations in [p]resenting [r]isk [i]nformation”). 
139 Viscusi and his collaborators, in addition to other scholars, have conducted experiments to 
determine the best form and format for workplace hazard warnings. See, e.g, Mamdouh I. Farid & 
Sidney I. Lirtzman, Effects of Hazard Warnings on Workers’ Attitudes and Risk-Taking Behavior, 68 
PSYCHOL. REP. 659, 670 (1991) (“The data also support that workers are capable of perceiving changes 
in job hazards and changing their job-related attitudes, intentions, and demands accordingly.”). See 
generally VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS, supra note 14, at 197–205 (presenting data to “explore the 
impact of individuals’ job hazard perceptions on their quit intentions”); VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 
14, at 98–124 (discussing experiments and results). 
140 Linda McCauley et al., Oregon Indigenous Farmworkers: Results of Promotor Intervention on 
Pesticide Knowledge and Organophosphate Metabolite Levels, 55 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 
1164, 1164 (2013) (“Most frequently the [pesticide] training is conducted in either English or Spanish. 
There are no state- or federal-specified guidelines on how to provide culturally and linguistically 
appropriate training of the increasing numbers of farmworkers whose primary language is indigenous, 
who speak neither English nor Spanish, or who understand very rudimentary Spanish at best.”). 
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requirement, the agency received comments from employers that “[p]osters 
are an ineffective means of educating workers and are rarely read by 
employees,”141 and that “adding one more notice to the many that are 
already mandated under other statutes will simply create more ‘visual 
clutter’ that contributes to employees’ disinclination to pay attention to 
posted notices.”142 Another employer stated in a comment that, “My 
bulletin boards are filled with required notifications that nobody reads. In 
the past 15 years, not one of our 200 employees has ever asked about any 
of these required postings. I have never seen anyone ever read one of 
them.”143   
In addition, as I have pointed out in previous work, in an analysis of 
surveys of over 4300 low-wage workers, “approximately 59% of low-
wage, front-line workers did not know their minimum wage and overtime 
rights and 78% did not know how to file a government complaint.”144 
Because both subjects are addressed explicitly on the required FLSA poster 
discussed above, this lack of Type B legal knowledge may be evidence of 
the shortcomings of this method of information dissemination. 
Research by Pauline Kim also suggests that, even in the face of explicit 
statements about the lack of job security in at-will jobs, many workers 
continue to believe that they can be fired only for good cause.145 Kim 
hypothesizes that powerful social norms about fair treatment may trump 
even the most clear statements of the limits of the law.146 In order for the 
transmission of information to “take,” therefore, the mechanisms for 
information transmission that are currently in place in the workplace may 
be too limited, passive, and unobtrusive. 
Even assuming perfect and complete transmission of all necessary 
information, however, workers, regulators, and outside interest groups may 
still be unmoved to address a disclosed workplace problem. This is because 
                                                                                                                          
141 Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,017 
(Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Alexander & Prasad, supra note 44, at 1110. 
145 Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of 
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110, 133 (1998) (quizzing over 330 
unemployed workers on knowledge of at-will employment legal rules and finding that workers gave 
correct answers only 51% of the time on average); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: 
Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 458 (1999) 
[hereinafter Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law] (administering the same survey in multiple additional 
states and finding corresponding correct answer rates ranging from 25.2% to 40%); see also David 
Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in 
the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 59, 63 (2005) (“There is little reason to believe that 
workers uniformly exercise rights granted them under labor policies.”). 
146 Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law, supra note 145, at 448 (“[I]t appears that workers do not 
readily distinguish between informal norms and enforceable legal rights, between what they believe the 
law should be and what it actually is.”). 
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the content of the information transmitted may be inimical to rights-
enforcing and market action. For example, Ms. Matthew worked at 
numerous farms beginning when she was six years old, all of which she 
believes made indiscriminate use of extremely toxic agricultural 
pesticides.147 Even perfect Type B context information about the other jobs 
available to her as a farmworker might not have prompted her to change 
jobs, as no other, better job existed. Likewise, if the H-2B workers in 
Mississippi had sought to change jobs, they, too, would not have been 
helped even by perfect Type B information, as the rules of their visas 
prohibited them from working for any other employer.148 Similarly, perfect 
Type C information about the process for engaging in a rights-enforcing 
response to a workplace problem may not actually trigger rights-enforcing 
activity if that process is too burdensome or complex.149 Finally, if a 
worker learns through Type D information that retaliation for a workplace 
complaint is a virtual certainty, then she will be unlikely to take action. 
Here, information transmission may in fact have a silencing, rather than 
action-triggering, effect.   
Indeed, my previous study of low-wage workers’ actions in the face of 
disclosed workplace problems revealed a drop-off of more than forty 
percent between problem identification and legal claims, meaning that 
almost half of workers who knew that their rights had been violated did not 
pursue legal redress.150 Similarly, scholars have criticized the Ellerth/ 
Faragher structure precisely because many survivors of workplace 
harassment choose not to make complaints despite the availability of—and 
their knowledge of—anti-harassment law, policies, and complaint 
procedures.151 Thus, even if workplace transparency mandates were 
completely effective in transmitting complete information to workers, 
whether workers do in fact become the “adjunct[s] to proper enforcement 
of the statutory provisions”152 envisioned by the proponents of information-
centric strategies, and whether regulators and outside interest groups 
engage in rights-enforcing or market responses of their own, remain open 
empirical questions in need of further study. 
                                                                                                                          
147 SLONGWHITE, supra note 3, at 38–39. 
148 Preston, supra note 40. 
149 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14 (describing the months-long, highly burdensome process 
under the Environmental Protection Act’s Worker Protection Standard of requesting and ultimately 
gaining access to the name of pesticides to which a worker was exposed). 
150 Alexander & Prasad, supra note 44, at 1089. 
151 Hernández, supra note 97, at 1239 (“The statistical analysis of survey responses from a group 
of 120 female sexual harassment victims suggests that White women and Women of Color may differ 
in their uses of internal complaint procedures.”); Sachs, supra note 97, at 2744–45 (“[R]esearch 
suggests that the number of complaints filed dramatically under-represents the extent of statutory 
violations.”). 
152 Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, 14 Fed. Reg. 7516 (Dec. 16, 1949). 
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V.  CONCLUSION  
This Essay has presented a comprehensive theory of information’s role 
in the enforcement of labor and employment laws, and in the broader 
project of improving workplace conditions. It has identified three sets of 
actors, as consumers of workplace information, who might engage in 
rights-enforcing or market responses to workplace problems, and examined 
the different types of information necessary to each actor for each type of 
response.   
The typology of workplace information developed here is an important 
extension of the existing literature, which has tended to confine its 
examination of transparency mandates to those that force the disclosure of 
information about the hidden conditions of work. As shown here, those 
disclosures may be necessary but not sufficient to trigger action to address 
workplace problems. Moreover, this Essay provides an important 
framework for assessing calls, such as Estlund’s, for greater transparency 
in the workplace.153 If such proposals focus only on revealing firm-specific 
information about the hidden conditions of work, then they will be unable 
to harness the market and facilitate law enforcement in the way that 
proponents envision.   
A second, companion article takes up these questions on a more 
practical level,154 investigating whether and in what circumstances 
workplace transparency mandates might raise First Amendment issues, and 
how mandates might best be structured to better accomplish their first-
order goal of informing their target audiences and their second-order goal 
of improving the conditions of work. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
153 Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 364–66 (listing categories of information that might 
be disclosed via workplace transparency mandates).  
154 Alexander, supra note 22. 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE 3: FLSA Poster155 
                                                                                                                          
155 Employee Rights Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Poster, supra note 71. 
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FIGURE 4: Sample NLRB Remedial Notice156 
                                                                                                                          
156 McKinney v. Creative Vision Res., No. 12-cv-1934, Ex. B at 33 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 2013) 
(order denying motion to strike). 

